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Executive Pay:  
Board Reciprocity Counts 
 
Abstract 
We study the influence of the corporate board network on executive pay for 3,395 US firms between 
1990 and 2015. We identify three elementary structures through which the interlocking network reflects 
forms of inter-group reciprocity across firms: restricted exchange, when two executives sit on each other’s 
respective boards; delayed exchange, when y sits on the board of x after the end of x’s mandate on the board of 
y; and generalized exchange, when x sits on the board of y, who sits on the board of z, who sits on the board of 
x. These ties, which are overrepresented, are related to higher executive pay, but are not related to firm 
performance, which we interpret as a form of rent extraction. We use the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) as a 
natural experiment to confirm our results. The impact on pay disappears after 2004, once these types of 
exchanges are constrained. 




1. Introduction  
Executive pay has been and continues to be a contentious topic in the corporate world 
and in the public sphere. This debate is accompanied by a question about the nature of the 
processes driving compensation: is the compensation a reward for talent and performance 
or is it extraction of rent?  
On the one hand, numerous scholars argue that levels of executive pay simply reflect 
the operation of an efficient market where executive talent and effort are duly 
compensated. This view is based on the underpinning assumption that the level of 
compensation provides a way of aligning the manager’s incentives with the interests of the 
principal ‒ i.e., the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1979). In turn, firms need to 
compensate outstanding human capital, which is now more transposable (Murphy and 
Zábojník 2004). Moreover, the small differences in marginal productivity and the skewed 
distribution of firms’ size amplify the pay dispersion even further (Gabaix and Landier 
2008). 
A competing body of research argues that executive pay reflects directors’ successful 
attempts to extract unjustified compensation. CEOs are often paid simply for good luck 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001). Executives demanding comparable pay levels to those 
of their peers produce a leapfrogging phenomenon (DiPrete et al. 2010; De Vaan et al. 
2019). Executives’ rent extraction is all the more likely that directors tend to poorly 
represent shareholder interests because their appointment, renewal etc. rely in part on the 
CEOs whom they are supposed to monitor (Bebchuk and Fried 2004).  
Regulatory definitions state that external director’s role is purely one of monitoring and 
controlling firms’ executives. However, such a unidirectional relation is difficult to 
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maintain, as it is at odds with social exchange that comes with ongoing interactions. 
Indeed, one of the most constant phenomena produced by social exchange is reciprocity 
(Mauss 2000; Lévi-Strauss 1969; Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005; Molm 2010). Lévi-
Strauss’s (1969) structural theory of kinship shows that the elementary rules organizing the 
exchange of women between masculine lineages along principles of reciprocity are critically 
important for enforcing a ban on incest and for strengthening group solidarity. Such 
reciprocity is also at the heart of social embeddedness in economic life (Granovetter 1985; 
Uzzi 1996, 1997). Reciprocity also encourages trust (Molm 2010) and increases tie stability 
and resilience (Burt 2005). Ties between independent directors and executives are also 
likely to produce various forms of reciprocity (Westphal et al. 2012). In turn, the 
establishment of reciprocity norms may lead to a less effective monitoring and higher CEO 
pay. 
Analyzing CEO pay as affected by relational reciprocity is related to existing literature 
on board interlocks. However, despite forty years of research, we still do not completely 
understand the implications and impacts of these interlocks. For example, assessing the 
two first decades of research in this area, Mizruchi (1996) confesses that if interlocks 
matter, it might be more through their impact on the diffusion of management style ‒ as 
shown by the diffusion of the poison pill (Davis 1991) ‒ than through their impact on 
performance.  
One possible reason why interlocks, commonly approached with network-wide 
measures such as density or centrality, are not a best fit for studying businesses’ class power 
and cohesion (Mizruchi 2013) or firms’ power within the economic field (Chu and Davis 
2016), may relate to the fact that the overarching logic governing board appointments 
obeys neither class nor firms’ long-term interests. Recent research has been more 
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successful in highlighting the impact of interlocks by paying greater attention to structures 
that reflect local solidarity between directors rather than firms’ global strategies, thus 
enabling managerial entrenchment and a reduction in shareholder pressure (Benton 2016). 
This is achieved through a board composition where executive directors align themselves 
with their directors’ practices. For example, interlocked executives reject shareholders’ 
proposals (Benton 2017); use provisions against shareholders’ interests (Benton 2016); 
match their compensation packages upwards (Kim, Kogut and Yang 2015); conform in 
funding the same political party (Burris 2005); and engage in opportunity hoarding (Tilly 
1998) in favor of executives with similar educational backgrounds (Kramarz and Thesmar 
2013). Benton (2016) also further shows that the cohesion of the local interlock network 
fuels managerial entrenchment and suggests that the “norms of reciprocity” in cohesive 
settings are at the heart of this process. 
However, these studies, which use board co-membership as the core constitutive tie in 
the network of directors, cannot distinguish potential instances of reciprocity, from other 
network-expressed phenomena, such as informational privilege, influence, imitation, 
conformity or conflict avoidance. For instance, the prior research which finds a link 
between a firm’s interlock centrality and their executive pay could be interpreted as either 
the fair remuneration of an informational advantage or as a sign of lax board monitoring 
(Horton et al. 2012; Renneboog and Zhao 2011). To address these problems, we suggest a 
two-fold contribution. First, instead of using whole-network measures whose interpretation 
is ambiguous we use dyadic measures that better capture more exact manifestations of 
reciprocity. Second, within these dyadic ties we focus on measures that, we believe, are 
better suited to capture reciprocal exchange. Following this approach and in contrast with 
previous literature, we will concentrate on ties between non-executive and executive and 
leave ties between non-executive directors out of the analysis. This distinction between the 
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two types of ties is based on the assertion that tied non-executive directors do not typically 
depend on one another and tend not to engage in complex exchanges to the extent that 
tied external and executive directors do, as the latter tie embeds appointment, control, 
payment, mutual respect, honor, and favors (Bebchuk and Fried 2004).  
Therefore, we define as a control tie the tie between a non-executive board member and 
an executive director as the core tie of our network. Control ties relates to the fact that the 
role of non-executive board members is officially to control and monitor the action of 
executive directors. This definition of network ties, contributes to the prevailing conceptual 
frameworks in the literature in two important ways. Firstly, the definition enables us to 
reconcile the corporate governance view, which focuses on control, with the interlocking 
view, which focuses on network structure. Secondly, it permits us to identify more precisely 
the reciprocity mechanisms ‒ where reciprocity can be measured both in the selection of 
partners (I select you; you select me) and in the outcome of the exchange (I favor you; you 
favor me).  
Based on these insights, we study the impact of inter-board reciprocity on executive pay 
among 3,995 US firms between 1990 and 2015. Following structural anthropology and 
social exchange theory, we isolate three basic reciprocity structures: restricted exchange, when 
two executives sit on each other’s respective boards; delayed exchange, when y sits on the 
board of x after the end of x’s mandate on the board of y; and generalized exchange, when x 
sits on the board of y, who sits on the board of z, who sits on the board of x. These three 
types of ties, although not very common, are more frequent than those calculated by 
chance. Our findings indicate that after initiating any one of these three forms of reciprocal 
ties, executive directors pay increases, notably bonuses. These results extend considerably 
previous studies (Hallock 1997; Fich and White 2003; Bebchuk and Fried 2004) which 
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targeted only restricted exchange and did not control for time invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity.  Moreover, we develop and test additional dimension of exchange (i.e. 
delayed exchange and generalized exchange), which are new to the research.  
Our research design also contributes to the literature by using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(2002) regulatory shock as a natural experiment. Once some of these exchanges are 
constrained, their impact on pay disappears.  Our findings contribute to our understanding 
of corporate remuneration and its potential regulation. By combining elements from social 
exchange literature with settings from compensation research we show that universal forms 
of social reciprocity underline managerial behavior. Following this contribution, we also 
add a strong empirical evidence to the rent extraction literature.  
The paper is organized as follows: In the second section, we detail our theoretical 
approach in relation to the previous literature. In the third section, we describe the data and 
the modeling equations used. In the fourth section, we present our main results and in the 
last section, we provide a general discussion of our findings. 
2. Theory: From elementary social exchange to executive 
solidarity 
Corporate remuneration: Research state of the art  
 Corporate governance rules state that the main duties of the board of directors are to 
monitor and govern the firm, to set optimal compensation contracts, and to protect the 
interests of the shareholders (McNamara 2008). Given this, academic research on 
corporate governance aiming to explain executive pay provides two main viewpoints. First, 
the market view (efficient contracting) argues that executives are paid for the services they 
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provide to the firm (Murphy and Zábojník 2004; Gabaix and Landier 2008), while the 
skimming view (rent extraction) contends that executives transfer wealth from the 
shareholders by exploiting the managerial power that their corporate and inter-board 
positions provide (Bebchuk and Fried 2003; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001).  
Both views regard board independence as central to assessing and determining the 
efficacy of boards and the level of pay CEOs deserve. The fundamental assumption is that 
the more independent the boards are, the more likely they are to be effective monitors and 
thus set optimal compensation contracts. Conversely, non-independent boards might 
behave out of deference to the executives they are supposed to monitor, and therefore 
provide them with greater opportunities to rent extract. Empirical evidence supports this 
latter view. For example, Core at al. (1999) find that when the board of directors is less 
independent (i.e., when there is a larger board with a lower percentage of outside directors, 
the CEO is also the chairman, and the outside directors were appointed by the CEO), 
CEOs are paid significantly more. Similarly, recent regulation in 2002‒2003 requiring, inter 
alia, that the compensation committee consist of only independent directors, has been 
found to reduce CEO pay (Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2009). 
One stream of research investigates the implications of a director’s social network on 
their ability to monitor and govern effectively. To date, this research has provided 
inconclusive evidence as to whether the association between network structure and 
compensation benefits shareholders. Several papers provide evidence to suggest that 
director networks enable the executives to rent extract. As Bebchuk and Fried (2003) and 
Benton (2016) argue, managers use their connections to increase CEO entrenchment and 
board dependence, which allows them to extract economic rents. Under these conditions, 
CEO compensation packages do not have the effect of serving the strategic goals of the 
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firm nor of enhancing shareholder value (Barnea and Guedj 2006; Kirchmaier and 
Stathopoulos 2008; Brown et al. 2012; Fich and White 2005; Li and Roberts 2017). For 
instance, Hallock (1997, 1999) finds that reciprocal interlocks are associated with higher 
CEO cash compensation (although not total compensation) and with worse firm 
performance. Similarly, Fich and White (2003) find that the number of reciprocal interlocks 
is positively associated with CEO compensation but find no association between these 
interlocks and various measures of firm performance (see also Fich 2000; Fich and White 
2005). However, Devos et al. (2009) find that the presence of interlocked directors is 
associated with lower firm performance and lower pay-for-performance sensitivity. 
Moreover, several papers find evidence supporting efficient contracting as well as finding 
that CEOs are paid for the valuable information and resources their network connections 
provide (Horton et al. 2012; Engelberg et al. 2013; Larcker et al. 2013). Finally, Renneboog 
and Zhao (2011) find mixed results providing support for both views.  
Similarly, research focusing on the CEOs’ connections indicates that these ties can 
either provide the CEO with significant managerial influence and power (Bebchuk et al. 
2002) or alternatively, provide informational and resource benefits to the firms for which 
the CEO is rewarded. A number of papers find evidence consistent with the former. 
Hwang and Kim (2009) find that socially dependent boards ‒ i.e., boards where the 
directors have social ties to the CEO ‒ offer higher pays levels to their CEOs. Brown et al. 
(2012) examine all CEO ties, social and professional, created by CEOs during their life and 
obtain similar results to Hwang and Kim (2009). Conversely, prior research also finds 
evidence of CEO networks providing valuable resources to the firm. Engelberg et al. 
(2013) establish that a CEO’s connections outside of the firm ‒ e.g., past professional, 
alumni and social ties ‒ are valuable to the firm in terms of the information they bring and 
 
 10 
hence, CEOs are paid for such valuable and portable ties. Horton et al. (2012) find that the 
centrality of the CEO and other directors is positively associated with their compensation 
and future firm performance.  
This inconclusive and at times contradictory evidence regarding the forces that drive 
corporate remuneration could be due to a lack of precision in previous research designs. In 
essence, the current literature finds that higher centrality in the interlocking network is 
associated with higher pay and that homogeneous boards pay more. However, centrality 
could either encompass classical informational and power advantages either for the firm, 
for the executives or for both (Burt 1992) or capture a position within a network of social 
exchange, where repeated exchange reinforce solidarity and mutual obligations. To isolate 
this latter mechanism, often suspected (Benton 2016) but never precisely measured, below 
we will review social anthropology and social exchange theories which examine the 
dynamics of social exchange. We utilize insights from these theories to both uncover a 
form of reciprocity that may be at work in corporate interlocks and define a new set of 
interlock measures enabling to capture its effects. 
From to kinship to inter-board solidarity 
In the Gift, Mauss (2000) highlights that in numerous traditional societies, inter-group 
social exchanges are governed by three rules: giving, receiving, and reciprocating. Drawing 
on Mauss’s gift-giving approach, Lévi-Strauss (1969) developed a theory of elementary 
rules of kinship ‒ the positive rules governing the exchange of women between the 
masculine lineages of a tribe ‒ as a way of both banning incest and organizing solidarity 
through exchange between different lineages. Lévi-Strauss identifies two main forms of 
exchange: restricted exchange, which derives from the preferential union with a bilateral 
cross-cousin and corresponds to a situation where two masculine lineages exchange women 
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at each generation; and generalized exchange, which derives from the preferential marriage 
with a matrilateral cross-cousin, where women are exchanged indirectly. In such cases, the 
lineage from which one receives a woman is not the same as the one to which one gives a 
woman. Although not discussed extensively, the union with a patrilateral cross-cousin also 
exists (Lane 1962) and corresponds to a delayed exchange. A lineage reciprocates for the 
woman received by giving a woman at the following generation. 
Recruiting directors of a firm to the board of another firm is different from forming 
kinship relations, but both activities are aiming at ‒ or at least unintentionally contribute to 
‒ strengthened affinities between the two groups. In the case of interlocking directors, 
expertise, information, and social capital are frequently shared or exchanged through the 
interlock. Indeed, executives and firms do foster social exchanges through board 
membership, and CEOs hold most of the power in appointing outside directors (Bebchuk 
and Fried 2004). It should be noted that this exchange is not simply one of control, but 
also involves attendance fees and reputation. Moreover, when a CEO invites another CEO 
to join their board, this invitation might sometimes come as a result of reciprocal exchange. 
Figure 1 approximately here 
We define restricted exchange (Figure 1) as a situation in which two executive board 
members from two firms simultaneously sit on each other’s boards as non-executive 
directors. It is probably the most obvious form of reciprocity among executives (Hallock 
1997). However, this type of interlock has garnered academic attention and regulatory 
criticism, as it raises significant concerns as to whether a director charged with overseeing 
an executive can be truly independent. Certainly, this type of pattern provides an 
opportunity for a tit-for-tat exchange. Specialists in exchange theory distinguish between 
two forms of restricted exchange: direct negotiated exchange, where actors negotiate on the 
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terms of an agreement, and direct reciprocal exchange, where actors perform successive acts in 
favor of one another without agreeing on those acts, and with no insurance of reciprocity 
(Molm, Collet and Schaefer 2007). It is not possible to argue that all such restricted 
exchange structures systematically correspond to direct negotiated exchange. In some cases, 
CEOs may deliberately agree to push each others pay up in an “I raise your pay, you raise 
my pay” bargain. Many of those exchanges, however, may be more subtle than simple tit-
for-tat bargaining. Without any explicit agreement, executives involved in restricted 
exchange may be subconsciously more generous when it comes to determining the pay of 
the executives they monitor. This is consistent with the findings from natural experiments 
which indicate the role of strong ties between members of the committee and applicants in 
academic recruitment (Godechot 2016). 
Delayed exchange (Figure 1) is a situation where an executive director of firm x sits on the 
board of firm y and invites an executive of firm y to join the board of a firm x after the 
executive’s own board membership in firm y has ended. Delayed exchange is a less visible way 
for CEOs to reciprocate and therefore receives less attention than the more obvious 
restricted exchange discussed above. Delayed exchange corresponds more clearly to direct reciprocal 
exchange (Molm, Takahashi and Peterson 2000; Molm, Collet and Schaefer 2007). Relative 
to simultaneous restricted exchange, delayed exchange may seem more insecure, precisely 
because of this delay. However, in his account of Mauss’s gift-giving theory, Pierre 
Bourdieu underlines precisely the importance of the delay (Bourdieu 1990). Without delay, 
gifts and counter-gifts are like barter or commercial exchange. Even worse, a simultaneous 
counter-gift equivalent in kind to the initial gift could be considered an offense (i.e., a non-
acceptance of the gift). Finally, compared to direct negotiated exchange, direct reciprocal exchange 
gives less salience to conflict (Molm, Collet and Schaefer 2007). Therefore, the delay grants 
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some symbolic meaning and some solemnity to the social exchange. It probably operates 
through a mechanism of mutual indulgence rather than tit-for-tat agreement. 
Finally generalized exchange is a situation where an executive director of firm x sits as a 
non-executive board member of firm y, which has one executive board member sitting on 
the board of firm z, which has one executive board member sitting on the board of firm x. 
This tie is seldom recognized by regulators or academics and indeed is never discussed in 
relation to CEOs. However, because of its importance in kinship theory, generalized 
exchange has generated debate as to its likelihood and its efficacy (Lévi-Strauss 1969; 
Homans and Murray 1955; Bearman 1997; Takahashi 2000; Molm, Collet and Schaefer 
2007). Lévi-Strauss (1969) considers generalized exchange to be a way of creating solidarity 
and as a device for building a society. On the contrary, Homans and Murray (1955) doubt 
that generalized exchange could exist without meeting the direct interest of each actor 
involved in the exchange. Controlled experiments have shown that generalized exchange 
actually produces more feelings of solidarity than restricted exchange (Molm, Collet and 
Schaefer 2007), although the emergence of generalized exchange remains puzzling 
(Takahashi 2000). Why set up a gift-giving chain when there is such a risk of free-riding, 
chain interruption, and the possibility of not receiving any gift in return? Most authors 
derive such structures from norms and from forms of altruism. Although, de facto, we find 
classical examples of generalized exchange for kinship (Lévi-Strauss 1969; Bearman 1997) 
or for kula exchange (Malinowski 1922), most studies on the dynamics of networks in 
contemporary society do not find a tendency to engage in generalized exchange (Lazega, 
Lemercier and Mounier 2006; Snijders, Van de Bunt and Steglich 2010). Nevertheless, if 
this structure randomly appears, it can still produce solidarity among actors involved.  
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A regulatory shock in reciprocal exchange among boards 
These three classical types of reciprocal exchange are also relevant for identifying 
precise patterns of mutual dependence between a firm’s executives and some of its external 
board members. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, detailed below, was introduced to enable 
regulators to limit, inter alia, the biases reciprocal exchange create, for instance on pay. 
Thus it provides us with an exogenous shock in which to examine the strength of our 
theory. 
 Following several corporate scandals in 2001 and 2002, US institutions favored a 
redefinition of director and board independence. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) places a 
stronger emphasis on board independence, especially within audit committees. Both the 
NYSE and the NASDAQ published new rules validated by the SEC in November 2003 
and asked listed firms to apply them in 2004. These new rules added a supplementary 
recommendation to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act regarding board independence, especially 
within the compensation committees. Hence, in section 303A.02 of its Listed Company 
Manual, the NYSE requires that all members of the board’s compensation, audit, and 
nomination committees be fully independent. A board qualifies a director to be fully 
independent if the director “has no material relationship with the listed company.” This 
prevents the source of a director’s compensation from being dependent on the 
management of the listed firm. As a consequence, a director is not independent if “the 
director or an immediate family member is, or has been within the last three years, 
employed as an executive officer of another company where any of the listed company’s 
present executive officers at the same time serves or served on that company’s 
compensation committee.”1 This rule does not ban all forms of restricted exchange, but 
forbids two executive directors from two different firms being on each other’s 
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compensation committees. The NASDAQ set up similar rules but only requires a majority 
of compensation, audit, and nomination committee members to be fully independent.  
These codes can therefore serve as a natural experiment for the social exchange 
mechanism. The codes target mainly restricted exchange ‒ and to some extent delayed 
exchange (at least the short delays) ‒ within compensation committees. However, longer 
delayed exchange and generalized exchange are not recognized and thus not covered. 
Listed firms may still implement restricted and delayed exchange. However, since directors in 
such reciprocity ties are excluded from compensation committees, they are less likely to 
directly influence the precise setting up of executive pay. This should therefore weaken 
their effect on executive pay.  
* 
Overall, investigating the impact of these three reciprocity structures on executive pay 
could help us uncover some of the mechanisms through which executives extract rents. In 
contrast to other network structures like centrality which increase CEO pay mostly as a 
result of the key informational and social resources central executives bring to the firm 
(Horton et al. 2012), the reciprocal ties we investigate here create network redundancy and 
do not increase informational flows or “structural holes” type of social capital (Burt 1992). 
In contrast, they do create mutual dependence between executives – I monitor you / you 
monitor me – and provide incentives for (conscious or subconscious) leniency when an 
executive has to set the pay of another executive from which he or she depends. These 
network structures, although very specific, enable us to test that solidarity among 
executives can drive rent extraction. In addition, two statistical analyses will contribute to 
corroborate our findings. Firstly, the evolution of the reciprocity structure payoff after 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act once executives embedded in such reciprocity structures are kept away 
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from pay setting. If these ties mainly provide social and informational resources to the firm, 
the effect should remain constant. Conversely if these ties fuel solidarity in pay setting, they 
should decline once monitored. Secondly, we will measure the impact of these network 
structures on firm’s economic outcomes (Horton et al. 2012). The resource approach leads 
to predict a positive tie. In contrast, our rent extraction approach predicts a null or a 
negative link.  
3. Data, modeling equations, and other variables 
Data 
Our sample is derived from multiple data sources. We obtained data from Boardex on 
US boards of directors for the period from 1990 to 2015 in order to analyze the structure 
of social exchange between boards. We selected quoted firms and private firms and 
dropped all other forms of organization (i.e., universities, charities, clubs, government, etc.). 
After this restriction, the initial sample contained 230,431 board members from 384,645 
unique firms, resulting in 1,091,118 board members×firm observations.  
We obtained executive pay data from the ExecuComp database. This database provides 
compensation data between 1992 and 2015 for 45,649 executives in 3,557 unique firms, 
resulting in 263,637 executives×firm×year observations. One fourth of this information 
(77,691) contains data on executive board members; the remaining data concerns top 
executives who do not sit on boards. 
We obtained firm-specific data from Compustat for the period from 1990 to 2016 to 
enable us to construct several control variables. For example, to control for a firm’s 
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revenue, we were able to obtain information for 30,413 firms, resulting in 329,789 firm×year 
observations. 
After merging these three datasets, our final sample contained 3,395 unique firms, with 
31,852 individual board members and pay for 45,288 executives. Between 1990 and 2015, 
each year in our final database contained between 2,000 and 2,700 unique firms, 6,000 to 
14,000 board members, and 8,000 to 12,000 executives (Table A1).  
From board composition to executive reciprocity structures 
Our network approach differs from prior interlock studies, which generally approximate 
the link between the numbers of contemporaneously interlocking CEOs. We concentrate 
on the precise intertwining of social exchange and corporate control. Therefore we do not 
consider, for example, that two executives sitting together as non-executive board members 
constitute a significant link of control, so these ties are ignored. Our network arc of 
executive control reflects the fact that an executive from one firm sits on the board of 
another firm as a non-executive board member and therefore controls the firm and its 
executive. To capture social exchange of control between executives, we employ the 
classical k-cycle measure from network literature.2 Therefore, we use 2-cycles (x→y→x) to 
measure restricted exchange, and 3-cycles (x→y→z→x) and 4-cycles (x→y→z→w→x) are 
used to measure generalized exchange. We ignore any k-cycle above 4, as these are both rare 
and unstable, and we suspect that these cycles are the random product of network 
connectivity and consequently do not produce any meaningful social effects. Finally, delayed 
exchange corresponds to firms which have among their non-executive board members an 
executive from a firm for which they had an executive on the board in the previous five 
years. In network language, this is a directed dyad x→y starting in t which reciprocates a 
reverse directed dyad y→x which existed in at least one year between t-5 and t-1 and 
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terminated before year t. In order to avoid overlap with past restricted exchange, we exclude 
from delayed exchange those that were previously restricted exchanges. 
Figures 2 and 3 approximately here 
Figure 2 provides an example of this control network for the year 2000, in the middle of 
our period. Most links are non-reciprocal and do not belong to any sort of cycle. Within 
this graph, we isolate, using different colors, the links that specifically belong to cycles or 
delayed 2-cycles. Approximately 11 percent of the control links between executives from 
different firms imply some form of reciprocity that could attenuate the control purpose. 
Figure 3 further isolates those ties between firms. The majority are in a 2-cycle (64 firms), 
while eleven firms are in a 3-cycle, three firms in a 4-cycle, seven firms in a 5-and-above-
cycle, and fourteen firms in delayed 2-cycles.  
Figure 4 and the Table A1 illustrate the sense of the evolution in reciprocity in the 
control network. Reciprocity in the control network increases in the 1990s, reaching a peak 
of 101 firms out of 2769 (3.6%) at the end of that decade. In the 2000s it declines 
substantially, especially after the mid-2000s. There are several reasons for such a decline. 
First, the corporate governance codes adopted a stricter notion of director independence 
for corporate boards and discouraged restricted exchange and other related forms of 
dependence between executive and non-executive directors. Second, firms tended to 
appoint fewer of their own executives onto their boards and generally to have only one 
executive on the board, commonly the CEO. COO or CFOs are generally not appointed 
anymore, which decreases the probability of such reciprocal ties. Finally, the decreasing 
density of interlocks and the fracturing of corporate America also contributed to a decline 
in the likelihood of reciprocal ties (Mizruchi 2013; Chu and Davis 2016). We will check 
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further whether this decline in reciprocity is due to a lower propensity to reciprocate or to a 
decline in reciprocity opportunities.  
Figure 4 approximately here 
Finally, Figure 4 also highlights the fact that in the early 1990s, the increase in 
reciprocity was in line with increases in executive pay. However, after 2000, executive pay 
declined only moderately during the dot-com crisis, especially in relation to option-based 
compensation. It stabilized at higher levels after 2003 and then appears to follow the 
business cycle (Kaplan 2013), unlike reciprocity, which declines substantially after 2005.  
Modeling equations 
Network dynamics 
In order to estimate the probability to reciprocate, we employ an elementary dyadic 
logistic regression. We model the probability that a firm x controls another firm y through 
the presence of at least one executive of the former firm on the board of the latter firm. 
We introduce reciprocity opportunities as our key independent variables. Reciprocity 
opportunities are defined as network configurations in t-1, which could be turned into a 
given reciprocity structure (hence restricted exchange, delayed exchange or generalized exchange) if a 
control tie is established in t between x and y. For instance, if y controls x in t-1, x has an 
“opportunity” to reciprocate by establishing a control tie in t on y. We thus measure the 
relative propensity to build a tie in such situations in contrast to others. The equation is as 
follows: 
P(firm x control firm y executives in time t) =past_controling_tie x,y,t-1  
+ reciprocity_opportunitiesx,y,t-1+ activityx, t-1+ popularity y, t-1 + yeart + errorijt  (1) 
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The 26-year longitudinal dimension of our data enables us to introduce a lagged 
structure of the network as a predictor of link formation or maintenance at time t. We 
therefore avoid the traditional endogeneity problem of synchronously explaining the 
network structure by itself. We only assume here that the lagged network is exogenous. 
While this assumption could still remain questionable, the length of our period enables us 
to limit the bias due to the introduction of lag-dependent variables. Logistic regressions, 
used similarly in previous studies (Rider 2012; Boussard et al. 2019), offer a great deal of 
flexibility, unlike SAOM (a.k.a. SIENA) and TERGM models (Snijders et al. 2010; 
Cranmer and Desmarais 2011), while also providing the advantage of handling much larger 
datasets.  
Impact of reciprocity structures on pay 
To determine the impact of reciprocity structure on pay, we estimate executives’ wage 
equations with two-year first-difference panel regressions. The two-year lag ensures that 
board members in reciprocity structures did not arrive in the middle of the year and were 
fully present the whole year and involved in all decisions processes during the year which 
impacted executive pay.3  We therefore model two-year wage evolution for a given 
executive in a given firm. Hence, firm×executives first-difference regressions account for 
firm×executives fixed effects on wage levels and therefore control for time-invariant 
characteristics of either the firm, the executive, or their match. First-difference models 
offer flexibility for estimating both short-term effects and longer-term effects of 
embeddedness in reciprocity structures. They also enable us to differentiate between 
entering and exiting a reciprocity structure. We therefore measure the impact of entering or 
exiting a reciprocity cycle on the evolution of executive wages.  
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In order to estimate classical multiplicative models for all continuous variables (except 
for the bonus to fixed salary ratio), we use inverse hyperbolic sine as a quasi-log function: 
sinh-1(x)=log(x+(x²+1)0.5), a “quasi-log” function which behaves like a log(x) for positive 
values, and like -log(-x) for negative ones and which enable to handle null values. We also 
control for a set of firm and individual time-varying variables described in detail below. 
Lastly, we include yearly fixed effects to control for common shocks in the evolution of 
executive pay. 
Our main equation is the following:  
Δ[t-k,t] sinh
-1(wageif)= Δ[t-k,t] firm_in_a_reciprocity_structuref + Δ[t-k,t] controlsif + yeart +errorift (2) 
In order to address eventual serial correlation of residuals and possible reverse causality 
effects, we also estimated Anderson-Hsiao (1981) models: we introduce on right hand side 
of equation 2 the lag of the first-difference of the dependent variable, instrumented with 
the past level of the lagged dependent variable.4  
Impact of reciprocity structures on performance 
Finally, to ascertain whether these forms of reciprocity reflect rent extraction, we 
investigate whether they have some impact on indicators of the firm’s operating 
performance post one (t+1) or two years (t+2). In order to capture time invariant 
unobservable heterogeneity, we continue to use a first-difference equation (Equation 4). 
Δ[t+k-1,t+k]firm_resultf= Δ[t-1,t] firm_in_a_reciprocity_structuref + Δ[t-1,t] controlsf + yeart +errorft (4) 
Variables 
We apply Equations 2 and 3 to seven dependent executive pay variables extracted from 
ExecuComp: fixed salary, bonus, bonus to fixed salary ratio, total cash, estimated present 
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value of stock options, total equity-related pay, and total compensation. Table A2 provides 
the descriptive statistics on all variables used to estimate equations 2 to 3.5 We “winsorize” 
the bonus to fixed salary ratio at the top 1% level.6 These variables are likely to have 
different sensibility to these temporary and infrequent reciprocity structures. Fixed wages 
evolve slowly from one year to another and are probably less sensitive to board discretion 
than variable pay. Among variable pay schemes, stock options and equity related pay are 
distributed through irregular plans, and the estimation of their present value may be 
difficult, which may make the link with reciprocity structures harder to estimate. In 
contrast, bonuses are subject to regular board discretion, through yearly attribution. Their 
cash dimension makes their estimation easier and more precise. We thus expect bonuses to 
be the most likely pay variable associated with reciprocity structures.  
In equations 2, 3, and 4 we introduce a number of executive, firm, and board controls. 
To control for individual executive heterogeneity, we include two executive characteristics 
available in Boardex: specifically, whether the executive is a CEO and whether the 
executive is a board member (while non-board member executives stand as the reference 
category). The number of executives described in the firm provides an approximation of 
the hierarchical position of executives in the firm: firms which describe the pay of more 
executives will probably describe executives lower in the hierarchy. While this last proxy is 
not very precise, the director-firm first-difference models also control for all time-invariant 
unobserved individual characteristics.  
To control for firm characteristics, we include firm size measured by both total assets 
and shareholders’ equity, and firm performance using sales and operating income. For all 
those amounts variables, we also use the sinh-1(x) quasi log function in order to estimate 
negative values. We also include a dummy variable to capture negative operating income, a 
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variable to control for one-year increase in operating income (difference in quasi-log), as 
well as a 3-year coefficient of variation of operating income to capture volatility (winsorized 
at p=0.01 and p=0.99) and return on equity (ratio of operating income to equity winsorized 
at p=0.01 and p=0.99). Finally, we include a dummy variable to control for any differences 
between private and public firms.  
We control for a number of board and network characteristics. Specifically, we control 
for the size of the board, which has been found to be a positive predictor of executive pay. 
We also proxy the position of the firm in the control network with two dummy variables 
which capture the network “popularity” and “activity.” We therefore control for the fact 
that at least one non-executive director also serves as an executive director in another firm 
(hence firm w → firm x, where “→” stands for control), and for the fact that one of the 
firm’s executive directors is a non-executive director elsewhere (hence firm x → firm z). 
Controlling for these two types of links is important when measuring the impact of cycles, 
as we need to make sure that cycles (hence firm y → firm x → firm y) really capture a 
reciprocal social exchange and not the combination of incoming and outgoing control ties.  
Finally, our variables of interest (the reciprocity structure described previously) are 
captured using three dummy variables, each taking the value of one if the cycle has: 1) at 
least one 2-cycle connection with another firm; 2) at least one delayed 2-cycle with another 
firm;7 and 3) at least one 3-cycle or one 4-cycle connection with another firm ‒ and zero 
otherwise.  
In order to estimate equation (4), we use t+1 and t+2 measures of the firm’s return 
(assets, equity, income, sales, ROE) as dependent variables and t network measures as 





Table A1 reports the description of the sample and the frequency of the reciprocity ties 
for each year. Over the full period 198 unique firms out 3395 were engaged at least in one 
year in a restricted exchange, 45 in delayed exchange and 59 in generalized exchange. Each year, on 
average, 1.4% of the firms are involved in a restricted exchange, 0.4% in a delayed exchange, and 
0.3% in a generalized exchange. Even before 2004, when cycling was higher, restricted exchange 
peaked at maximum 2.7%, delayed exchange at 0.8% and generalized exchange at 0.5% of the 
firms of our sample. These small frequencies could initially suggest that these ties are very 
scarce and therefore potentially not very meaningful. They could simply be an artifact of a 
random consequence of network dynamics, or even a situation that is deliberately avoided 
by corporate actors aiming to achieve sound corporate governance.  
In order to address this issue, we turn the matrix of control ties between non-isolated 
firms (≈2500*2500 firms) for each year into a dyadic database (Table 1). This generates a 
database of 163 million dyads. In order to manage it and run the models, we use scarce 
matrix tools and aggregate identical lines and estimated weighted descriptive statistics and 
regressions on a reduced matrix of 137,000 lines.  
This dyadic database enables us to investigate the occurrence of a control tie between 
two firms. In Column 1, we find that the average probability of occurrence of a control tie 
between a given firm y and a given firm x is approximately 0.013%. When the tie existed in 
t-1, the probability increases to 81% indicating, unsurprisingly, a strong persistence of ties 
(Column 2). Let us focus on whether a firm will cycle in t when it had an opportunity to do 
so. The existence of a reverse control tie in t-1 increases the probability of the formation of 
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control tie to 4%. Moreover, a former reverse control tie, even when it was severed, still 
increases the probability of occurrence of a control tie to 0.6%. The effect of inverted 2- or 
3-paths, which offer an opportunity for firms to engage in generalized exchange, also increases 
the probability of occurrence of a tie to 0.6%. 
Column 3 reports the results of our first estimation of Equation 1. We find positive and 
significant (p<0.001) coefficients on all three reciprocity ties. This suggests that firms do 
indeed favor reciprocating ties in board composition. The opportunities for restricted 
exchange, delayed exchange, and generalized exchange multiply the odds ratio of making a tie, 
respectively, by 3.6 (i.e., exp(1.25)), 74 (i.e., exp(4.31)) and 2.1 (i.e., exp(0.73)). So, although 
these cycles are rare ‒ mainly because opportunities for creating such ties are rare ‒ we find 
that when this opportunity does occur, firms use these ties more often than would be 
expected in a random distribution. 
To address the concern of a bias being introduced by the presence of the lag dependent 
variable, especially when it approaches unit root, we estimate our model without the main 
lag dependent variables (Model 2) and further estimate the model conditionally to the lag 
dyadic tie: tie creation (Model 3) ‒ when the tie did not exist in t-1 ‒ and tie maintenance 
(Model 4) ‒ when the tie already existed in t-1. We find that the results are qualitatively 
similar. The three reciprocity opportunities contribute to the tie, especially to tie creation. 
Past reciprocity contributes to tie maintenance, while past delayed and generalized exchanges do 
not have a significant effect on the latter. 
Table 1 approximately here 
In order to estimate the impact of the new requirements for board independence under 
the governance codes described earlier, we compare two periods: pre-requirements 
(1992‒2003) and post-requirements (2004‒2015) in Model 5.  
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The results indicate that after 2003, there is a strong decline in the tendency to achieve 
restricted and delayed exchange. Despite its decline compared to the pre-2004 period, tendency 
to restricted exchange remains positive and significant during the last period (when summing 
main and interaction effects). 
Conversely, the tendency to achieve generalized exchange does not decrease: the interaction 
effect is positive, but not significant, and the sum of the main effect and the 2004‒2015 
effect is strongly positive and significant. The decline in generalized exchange that we observe 
in the descriptives reported in Table 1 is therefore mainly due to the declining density of 
the networks. Executives have fewer occasions to achieve such forms, although they are 
more inclined to do so. 
Our results contrast sharply with those of Withers, Kim and Howard (2018), who find 
an increase in reciprocity in the period 2004‒2006 immediately following the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (2002). Part of the difference might be due to the size of their sample, which is 
much smaller than ours, and the methodology ‒ the sophisticated Stochastic Actor-
Oriented Model of network change (with the Siena software) versus very simple logistic 
regressions. However, we postulate that Withers, Kim, and Howard (2018) may have 
overlooked the time necessary for firms to adapt to the new recommendations concerning 
board governance.8 
Reciprocities and executive pay 
Table 2 approximately here 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics on the compensation of executives and the 
position in reciprocity cycles. This forms our first approach to investigating the relationship 
between structural forms of reciprocity and pay. Panel A clearly shows that executives in 
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firms embedded in cycles enjoy higher pay. For instance, firms engaging in restricted exchange 
pay on average +18% in fixed salary, +19% in bonuses, +19% in total cash, +117% in 
stock options, +60% in equity pay and +38% total compensation than firms that do not 
count any reciprocal ties within their board. The impact of delayed exchange ‒ or even more, 
of generalized exchange ‒ appears even stronger.  
However, those firms that resort to such reciprocity ties might also have some specific 
characteristics in terms of size, sector, or executive skills that could also explain the pay 
gap. Panel B alleviates some of this concern by following the average evolution in pay for 
each firm’s executives in the two years following the apparition of a reciprocity link within 
the board of directors. In the first year, restricted exchange, delayed exchange, and generalized 
exchange increase bonuses by, respectively, 6%, 85%, and 31%; total cash by 9%, 8% and 
0%; and total compensation by 10%, -4% and 14%. The two-year impact is even stronger, 
with respectively +12%, +13%, and +11% of total cash. Although these are only univariate 
results, this simple first-difference table imposes a highly demanding structure to the 
comparison, as it controls for time-invariant individual, firm, and individual×firm 
heterogeneities.  
To control for time-varying firm and individual heterogeneity we run Equation 2, the 
first-difference regression, which controls for the change in the hierarchical position of the 
executive, the change in the size of the firm and its operating performance, and the change 
in the position within the interlock network (Table 3). The use of the two-year difference 
model allows us to better summarize the joint effect of differences and lagged differences 
in reciprocity structures.9 Moreover, it also allows a better targeting of fully effective 
reciprocal ties already present from the first day of year t.  
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 The change in restricted exchange has a modest effect, producing a 7-point increase in the 
bonus to fixed salary ratio (Column 3) and a 5-point increase in total cash payment. Here, 
delayed exchange has no significant positive impact on pay in time t. We even find an 
unexpected negative impact on total compensation. Generalized exchange produces a positive 
association on pay. The coefficient on generalized exchange in Column 2 indicates a positive 
effect of 70% exp(0.532). Effects on bonus to fixed salary ratio and on total cash are 
positive and significant in the second year. This result is consistent with the findings 
reported in the social exchange literature that generalized exchange needs more time to 
produce an effect. 
Table 3 approximately here 
First results from Table 3 provide therefore mix support for the impact of executive 
interlock reciprocity on executive pay. The most robust impact is that of generalized exchange 
on bonuses. The effect of direct reciprocity already pinpointed in previous article Hallock’s 
(1997, 1999) is only mildly confirmed. However, in table 3, we mix two periods which are 
very heterogenous in terms of corporate governance and tolerance to interlock reciprocity. 
We therefore examine whether the increased pressure for sound corporate governance 
following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) and its implementation by the NYSE and the 
NASDAQ in 2003, and the correlative decline in interlock reciprocity shown by Table A1, 
also reduces the effect of reciprocity on executive pay. Here, this exogenous shock in 
corporate rules serves as a natural experiment on the efficacy of reciprocal ties on pay. As 
explained previously, it allows us to compare a first period where those restricted and delayed 
exchanges are not constrained with a period where they are constrained. Two mechanisms 
could be at play here. The new rules did not formally ban board cycles ‒ even the most 
obvious one, restricted exchange ‒ but banned “interlocks” (what we call restricted exchange) 
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from a board’s compensation committee. Interlocked directors can remain on the board 
and continue to potentially influence executive pay through their indirect influence and 
their votes on proposals by the compensation committee. The primary effect of the new 
regulation banning interlocks from compensation committees should, at a minimum, 
decrease the effect of restricted exchange.  
Could the effect remain positive? On the one hand, the criticisms addressed to restricted 
exchange could lead firms using it for other business reasons to become conscious that it 
also leads to some partiality in board monitoring. This process of conscientization could 
lead to the use of strategies to diminish the bias through increased restraint in pay. This 
additional phenomenon could lead to a negative effect of restricted exchange after 2003. 
On the other hand, when these forms of endogamy are criticized, they may be 
abandoned by the firms that wish to abide by the principles of sound corporate governance 
and remain in those firms that are run by more opportunistic executives who prefer weak 
corporate governance. This selection effect could drive up the positive effect of reciprocity 
on CEO pay and lead to its maintenance.  
The new regulation and its interpretation led to targeting restricted exchange and short-
term delayed exchange; it did not acknowledge or discuss long-term delayed exchange or 
generalized exchange. Consequently, we should not observe a decrease in the impact of 
generalized exchange. 
Table 4 approximately here 
Table 4 shows striking results for restricted and delayed exchange. Before 2004, restricted 
exchange between executives produces consistent pay premiums for all types of variable pay: 
restricted exchange increases bonuses +22% (exp(0.197)), bonus to fixed salary ratio by 9 
percentage points, total cash by +6%, options by +25%, and equity pay by +38%. 
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Similarly, delayed exchange increases bonus to fixed salary ratio by 15 percentage points and 
total cash by +7%. This is consistent and confirms Hallock’s (1997, 1999) findings for the 
pre-2004 period. Moreover, our controls for matched firm-executive fixed effects provide 
much stronger proof of the impact of restricted exchange during this period.  
Conversely, after 2004, the restricted exchange effect declines by a magnitude of -50% for 
bonuses, stock options and equity pay, of -12% for total pay. The decline is even more 
pronounced than the pre-2004 benefit. A similar result is found for delayed exchange, which 
was also partially targeted by the 2003 reform. Therefore, after 2004, having a restricted 
exchange tie in the board also leads to compensation that is significantly lower (for bonuses, 
options, and total pay) than executive outside any reciprocity tie.10 This phenomenon is 
consistent with a process where boards acknowledge their own bias. When they maintain 
an interlock, boards and executives appear to overreact to this source of positive bias by 
setting executive pay at a level below other firms. 
The opposite is true for generalized exchange, which remains the same or even increases 
after 2004, especially for bonuses and total cash. We also find a significant decline for 
options after 2004; however, this finding must be considered with caution due to the 
change in the definition of this variable during this period and to the impact of a limited 
number of outliers.  
Currently, under current corporate governance codes, generalized exchange is ignored and 
hence unlikely to be monitored. Consequently, it is not surprising that it continues to have 
a positive impact on pay during the second period. However, without any change in 
corporate norms, the declining participation of executives on boards, both as non-
executive board members and as executive directors, considerably diminishes the 
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opportunity for such cycles to be created. At the end of the period, generalized exchange no 
longer impacts pay, simply because this type of tie disappeared. 
Are these networks effects rent extraction? 
One could argue that cycles in board networks are linked to industrial strategies, such as 
building alliances between firms, exchanging information and testing the first steps of 
future mergers. Consequently, they could be tied to higher pay not because board members 
within reciprocity cycles are more generous when it comes to the evaluation of the 
executives they monitor, but because these executives are engaged through this type of tie 
in an industrial strategy that is profitable for their firm.  
In our prior models, we controlled for firm performance (see Tables 3 and 4) and the 
results indicated that the network effects continue to be associated with higher pay. 
However, the impact of the network on a firm’s performance may take time to materialize. 
We therefore investigate the impact of our three forms of reciprocity exchange on a firm’s 
performance in time t+1 and t+2. Firm performance is measured using a number of 
performance indicators: assets, equity, sales, income, and return on equity (ROE). 
Table 5 approximately here 
Table 5 reports the results of this additional analysis using first-difference models. The 
results provide very little evidence of improvements in firm performance over the 
following 2-year period. Reciprocity exchange is not significantly and positively associated 
with any of our measures of a firm’s performance, except for a small significant positive 
effect of delayed exchange on ROE in t+1 (which partly vanishes in t+2). We also find a 
negative and significant impact of generalized exchange on income and ROE during the first 
year. We do not find much evidence of significant differences in impact before and after 
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Sarbanes-Oxley. Overall, the picture suggests that there is no link between forms of 
exchange and forward measures of a firm’s performance11. Interlock cycles does not seem 
to correspond to a functional corporate strategy for increasing pay. It does not harm firms’ 
performance. Still, it increases executive pay. This therefore leads us to interpret the impact 
of reciprocal exchange on executive pay as being one of rent extraction, rather than an 
efficient market price for performance. 
5. Discussion: A tip of the iceberg phenomenon 
This article finds that firms engage in several forms of board reciprocities ‒ restricted, 
delayed, and generalized exchange ‒ which undermine non-executive directors’ independence 
and grant their executives higher pay, especially bonus payments and total cash. Our study 
makes several contributions.  
First, we contribute to social exchange theory. We show that mutual benefits for actors 
come not only from well-understood restricted exchanges, but also from being engaged in 
delayed exchange and generalized exchange. These results are all the more intriguing that these 
two exchange structures are generally considered less efficient given the opportunity to free 
ride and to not reciprocate. A possible explanation is that those structures also fuel 
stronger mutual obligation and give some solemnity to the exchange. 
Second, by specifically focusing on a form of social exchange whereby the actors are 
structurally tied to one another and have a common interest in improving each other’s pay, 
we add to the compensation literature. We provide additional support to previous studies 
finding a positive impact of homophilic ties on pay (Kramarz and Thesmar 2013; Kim, 
Kogut and Yang 2015). Because our results are based on time-varying solidarity within firm 
boards, they are less likely biased by a reflection effect (Manski 1993; Mouw 2006). Last, we 
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extend previous studies showing the positive impact on pay of restricted exchange (Hallock 
1997) in two ways. Firstly, we provide a stronger model of the impact of cross-directorship 
by considering the firm and individual constant unobserved heterogeneity; and secondly, 
we identify additional forms of reciprocity.  
Finally, we show that regulation did affect the association between board network and 
pay. The evolution of the norms defining board independence after 2004 serves as a natural 
experiment supporting the positive association of at least two of the reciprocity structures, 
restricted and delayed exchange, on pay. New codes of governance targeting these forms of 
social exchange as they were incompatible with full independence, excluded them from 
compensation committees. Following this new regulation, the pre-2004 premium of these 
types of exchange on bonuses and equity pay disappeared, and even reverted to a negative 
premium in executives’ pay. Conversely, generalized exchange, which was not targeted by 
corporate governance codes, remained effective. Hence, the implications of such regulation 
are twofold. Regulating pay-increasing strategies does have some effect. Once regulated, 
these strategies do not work as they used to. However, the overall effect of regulation on 
executive compensation will remain limited since executives can still switch from a 
regulated strategy to an unmonitored one. 
Overall, our results on the role of reciprocity structures contribute by documenting the 
existence and the mechanisms of rent extraction. Indeed, these results seem difficult to 
explain with informational or firm’s power mechanisms. A board of a firm entering 
reciprocity structures does not increase the flow of information profitable to the firm as a 
whole nor the economic power it exercises on its economic environment. Hence, as a 
result, it does not have any impact on the firms’ revenue. Conversely, entering those 
reciprocity structures does empower a limited set of individual actors: reciprocally 
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connected executives. On repeated occasions, they can support one another when it comes 
to pay determination. Hence, this paper contributes by highlighting that executives’ 
solidarity rooted in favorable network structures provides opportunities for rent extraction.  
Although the marginal effect of these reciprocity structures is substantial, the overall 
effect on executive pay and its evolution remains limited because these structures are rare. 
Indeed, with the fragmentation of corporate networks (Mizruchi 2013; Chu and Davis 
2016), they are almost non-existent after 2013. Had such reciprocal ties not existed, the 
levels and changes in CEO pay would not have been very different. For instance, 
counterfactually suppressing the pre-2004 premiums for the three reciprocal exchanges 
would have diminished global bonus amounts by only 2 percent in the year 2000. However, 
because we focus on very rare ties and structures, we argue that our findings only reveal the 
tip of the iceberg of the phenomenon.  
Executives are tied to one another via multiple sorts of ties, but we focus only on the 
most visible and the most traceable forms. By doing so, we believe we underestimate the 
multiplex and therefore complex types of exchange in the corporate world. Bourdieu’s 
analysis for French Academia may also hold true for US executives: “the circulation of 
services rendered can only be perceived at the level of a group of institutions, and it is rare 
that they take the visible form of a direct and immediate exchange (...) the longer, the more 
complicated and the more indecipherable for uninitiated is the cycle of exchange” (1988, p. 
86). Thus, a future challenge for social network analysts is to estimate the true size of the 
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1 Cf. NYSE Listed Company Manual, Section 303A.02 
2 In network literature, a k-cycle is a directed path of k degrees returning to its starting point. 
3 Hence, for the two-year changes in reciprocity structures, we only keep those occurring between t-2 and t-1 
and drop those occurring between t-1 and t. 
4 Results are similar to those estimated with the first difference models and will be sent on request. 
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5 In EXCUCOMP, we used SALARY for fixed salary, BONUS + NONEQ_INCENT for bonuses, 
SALARY + BONUS + NONEQ_INCENT for total cash. We used OPTION_AWARDS or, if the latter is 
missing, OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE or, if the latter is missing, 
OPTION_AWARDS_RPT_VALUE for options. We sum our option pay variable with STOCK_AWARDS 
or, if the latter is missing, with RSTKGRNT to calculate equity pay. Finally, total pay is given by 
TOTAL_SEC, or, if the latter is missing, by TDC1, or if the latter is missing by TDC2. 
6 To “winsorize” a variable is a technique which enables one to avoid the disturbances produced by extreme 
values. When a variable x is winsorized at a given fractile p (for instance p=0.99), it means that the variable x 
will be capped at the value xp. If x>xp then x* = xp , else x* = x . 
7 More precisely, a delayed 2-cycle corresponds to a situation where a given control tie (firm y → firm x) was 
preceded by an asymmetrical reverse control tie (firm x → firm y) during at least one of the five previous years 
(or was already a delayed 2-cycle in the preceding year). We nevertheless exclude cases where a given 2-cycle 
turns into a delayed one due to the severance of the tie, to avoid capturing the effect of the severance of the 
2-cycle.  
8 Hence, when we restrict Model 5 to 1998‒2006, we do find a positive but non-significant parameter on 
restricted exchange after 2003. 
9 In order to capture two-year changes in our reciprocity structures, we also imposed the one-year change to 
be equal to zero. Therefore, the firms enter or exit a reciprocity cycle between t-2 and t-1, and not between t-1 
and t. 
10 Results will be sent on request. 
11 The Anderson-Hsiao instrumental variable estimations also confirm this statement. Results will be sent on 
request. 
